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Introduction 
The idea that national and international policies are best built on cultural 
pluralism, or what is often termed multiculturalism, has almost achieved the 
status of common sense. Such a view is propagated on the recognition that 
societies around the world, due to complex social, political and ecological 
processes associated with old and new globalisation and the attendant mass 
and rapid migration of people, are much more mixed than the selective 
amnesia that historical nationalist narratives have hitherto acknowledged. Of 
course this does/has not resulted in the death of nationalisms; one only needs 
to switch on the TV across the globe, in each and every country we are seeing 
the reassertion of old as well as the birth of new nationalist movements, many 
of which have, such as the Golden Dawn party in Greece and the Tea Party 
movement in the US gained considerable ground following the 2008 
Economic melt down. In India in recent years we have seen the rise of 
Hindutva, in the UK we have groups like the UK Independence party and the 
English Defence League, In France the French National front regularly 
commands 25% of the popular vote in local and national elections. 
Whilst it clearly is the case that societies that chose to include through some 
form of accommodation, rather than exclude  - and in some cases 
‘exterminate’ - minorities and their respective cultural identities are much 
more desirable, the emergence of a new and altogether more sinister claims to 
cultural pluralism being made by religious fundamentalists, I content, 
exposes some of the limits to multiculturalism as it is most commonly 
understood. I want to suggest that the contradictions primarily arise out of 
accommodating specific belief systems which themselves might not be very 
accommodating broader universalist principles of human rights, such as or 
tolerance of difference. And it is this contradiction that reveals one of the 
central paradoxes of cultural pluralism as a manifestation of cultural 
relativism. (Healy, 2007:12). Whilst debates surrounding these two divergent 
perspectives can be located within a much broader sweep of history, the 
emergence of a public policy approach from 1970s that sought to 
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accommodate plurality of cultural standpoints known popularly as 
‘multiculturalism’ (Singh and Cowden, 2011) led to a renewed impetus 
surrounding debates about how best to respond to the needs of minority 
groups. Whilst the intention of this policy was to foster respect for different 
cultures and therefore to give minorities a sense of belonging, as Malik (1996) 
notes, it actually led to collusion between the (racist) state and opportunistic 
religious and cultural organisations in the guise of self-appointed community 
leaders. 
In this paper I seek to explore some of the tensions and complexities 
associated with expressions of ethnic identity (often manifested in terms of 
racial, religious, linguistic, class and caste differences) on the one and the 
needs to develop cohesive and integrated societies on the other. From the 
more general consideration, I will focus on a particular debate surrounding 
the question of religion that in the post 9/11 period in the context of the so-
called ‘War on Terror’ has been raging across the world but particularly in the 
West. In this regard, my primary focus will be on the challenge of 
accommodating religious identities and practices. 
The paper begins with a brief discussion of cultural identity or what it 
actually means to be different. I then go onto discuss the idea of 
multiculturalism and in particular how multiculturalist policies have sought 
to it to respond the contemporary assertion of religious identities and in 
particular how this has led to ‘new fault lines’ amongst traditional advocates 
of such approaches (Singh and Cowden, 2011). To ground the discussion, as 
any paper on social policy should do, I focus on the British Governments 
reactions to the emergence of so-called ‘Islamic Fundamentalist extremist 
groups’ and a concern with the influence they were having of young people.  
Making sense of Identity 
In his book, ‘Identity and Violence: The illusions of Destiny’ the economist and 
political philosopher Amartya Sen (2006) recounts a childhood experience 
during the last days of the British Raj in Bengal where he had a witnessed an 
stranger who was bleeding profusely and asking for water stumbling into the 
garden of his parent's house. He recalls shouted for his parents, and his father 
took the man to a hospital, where he died of his injuries. The man was a 
Muslim labourer who had been attacked by rioting Hindus. Reflecting on the 
incident he writes: "Aside from being a veritable nightmare, the event was 
profoundly perplexing." What makes neighbors living together in relative 
peace suddenly turn on each other, and most significantly, how could 
somebody with a complex identity belonging to many communities be 
reduced to a singular entity?  
For Sen the root to some of these problems is the way we think of human 
identity in essentialist or ‘solitarist’ ways; something he believes has shaped 
much of communitarian and multicultural thinking of both the left and right 
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in recent times. For example, in Samuel Huntingdon's theory of "clashing 
civilizations" Sen suggests a central fallacy with such thinking is the 
proposition that one can even contemplate the idea of ‘opposing civilizations’ 
as if each existed as some homogeneous mass. For him, the idea that human 
beings can be divided up such a way leads to a "miniaturisation" of humanity, 
with is often the precursor for the kinds of violence he writes about. It is for 
these reasons that much of Sen’s work and in particular his work on universal 
human capabilities, has sought to balance the idea of recognizing cultural 
differences with at least an equal commitment to aspects of human existence 
that are the same. By focusing on questions of justice and basic human needs, 
cultural differences are seen in a different light. That said, by refusing to offer 
any detailed list of universal capabilities and by emphasizing the importance 
of ‘self-evaluation’ he isn’t at all hostile to factoring in differences that may 
inhibit ones capacity to transform capability into functioning’s.  
In some senses Sen is seeking to disrupt the binaries of cultural relativism 
versus universalism, where relativists are seen a defenders of tradition and 
therefore regressive, and universalists as modernists and therefore 
progressives.  In a co-authored chapter with Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 
and Sen, 1989) entitled “Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions,” Sen 
and Nussbaum are critical of much of the representative work in 
developmental economics which they feel has succumbed such dichotomous 
ways. For them, such dichotomies are undermined once there is recognition 
of the internal diversity and criticism that exists within traditions as well as 
the mutual overlapping between and among cultures. It is precisely through 
identifying intercultural linkages that one can identify and endorse the 
valuation of basic, generally formulated capabilities, as well as the realization 
of those capabilities in the respective culture (Nussbaum and Sen, 1989 p.320). 
Whilst critical theorists and post-colonialist writers, have for some time 
warned of the dangers of crude essentialism and the related processes of 
binary thinking and othering’ (Derrida, Hall, Bhabba, Spivak), a key 
difference with them and Sen’s work is perhaps with the broader perspective 
on multiculturalism and the politics of difference. For Sen, a politics of 
difference, despite seeking to identify and address social injustice against a 
particular group is at the same time exposed to the slippery slope of 
essentialism, fundamentalism and ultimately communalism, where as post-
structuralism critiques of essentialism tend to lead not to a universalism, but 
rather a valorization of cultural relativism. For example, Derrida claims that 
there is no absolute identity or trans-historical truth and that what we know is 
simply a product of difference, which is total. Although his primary interest is 
in socio linguistics, his concept of différance constituting the notion to be 
different but also to differ, put off, Derrida has been understood by social 
theorists to explain that immanent and contingent nature of identity and by 
extension culture.  
Ethnicity and Public Policy Responses 
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Broadly speaking Multiculturalism represents a body of thought that seeks to 
identify reasoned and just ways to respond to cultural and religious diversity 
(Song, 2010).  In its contemporary usage it is closely aligned with the demands 
of minority groups within a given society to be afforded equal citizen rights 
as well as a positive recognition of their unique cultural identities. i.e. from 
mere tolerance of to a celebration of difference. Whereas in most Western 
countries multiculturalist policies have primarily remained within the scope 
of accommodation of difference, in some contexts where group rights become 
associated with forms of indigenous and minority nationalism, demands have 
extended to constitutional equations surrounding questions of self-
determination, as for example has been the case in various parts of India.  
One of the underpinning aspects of cultural pluralism is the notion of 
‘tolerance’. Historically speaking, the idea of tolerance came to the forefront 
in European societies following the Reformation in the sixteenth century 
when it was seen as a means of ending the bloodshed between difference 
religious denominations (Grell and Scribner, 2002). Essentially, the idea of 
tolerance was a response to the need to establish social cohesion through a 
combination of pragmatism and idealism. Hence, this constituted a 
conditional acceptance of difference in the short term, with the longer-term 
aim being one of assimilation through the development of common values 
and culture.  
It was the sense that tolerance represented a kind of cultural imperialism by 
stealth that led to the turn to ‘cultural relativism’. This was first articulated by 
the anthropologist Franz Boas over 100 years ago, and in suggesting that there 
was nothing absolute about human civilisation or culture and that cultural 
plurality was a fundamental feature of humankind (Boas, 1974), was seen as 
challenging Enlightenment notions of human progress. In sociology, the 
principle is sometimes practiced to avoid cultural bias in research, as well as 
to avoid judging another culture by the standards of one's own culture. For 
this reason, cultural relativism has been considered an attempt to avoid 
ethnocentrism or the tendency for people to negatively judge others on the 
basis of an assertion of a perceived superiority of one’s own cultural identity.  
Building policy 
The challenge of developing public policy for managing ethnically diverse 
societies is not new and in some sense poses a recurring challenge for all 
rulers although arguably moral imperatives of tolerance and justice have 
tended to be a secondary concern.  Policies can range from genocide (e.g. Nazi 
Germany), ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, India, on one side 
of the spectrum, to cultural assimilation, strategic accommodation (primarily 
for economic reasons), and on the other part of the spectrum, fully fledged 
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accommodations of minorities in the form of regal pronouncements1 through 
to constitutional settlements and government policies, including, for example, 
as in the case of India and the US, affirmative action policies to confront social 
disadvantage (Deshpande, 2013). 
Specifically in terms of multiculturalism, broadly speaking one can talk about 
two kinds of approaches, what might be termed ‘light multiculturalism’ and 
‘fully fledged multiculturalism’. When talking about light multiculturalism 
the broad policy approach is predicated on largely non-coercive attempts at 
integrating ‘new minorities’ into an imaginary national cultural imaginary 
because, as Anderson has outlined, National `identities are always products 
of the imagination i.e. idealized and normalized conceptions of belonging. 
This usually constitutes of a slow cultural assimilation based often on 
ideological manipulations associated with cultural imperialism (Young, 1998). 
Some differences, such as the need to provide bilingual services, may be 
‘tolerated’ as a temporary measure to achieve this. In the UK during the 
1960’s we saw such policies being developed in relation to large-scale arrival 
of migrant labourers from South Asia and the West Indies. Typically such 
policies included the establishment of immigrant centers and teaching of 
English and the relaxation of certain dress codes in Schools and public 
services (e.g. Sikhs bus drivers and conductors being allowed to wear turbans 
on buses) and the provision for different dietary needs in schools and 
hospitals or in the private sector making provisions for prayer rooms and sit 
down toilets). However, it must be noted that these and other 
accommodations often came across not through good will but community 
struggles and social movements. In the UK this form of what might be termed 
radical multiculturalism is most closely aligned with anti-racist social 
movements, which have been largely secular in nature, but which through 
both community based groupings and trade and workers groups have sought 
to confront the racialisation and oppression of non white people within 
different strands of society, from racial attacks and harassment, through to 
challenging cultural and racial stereotypes in the media, education etc 
through to instutionalised forms of direct and indirect discrimination. 
Multiculturalism and contemporary responses to the question of religion 
As noted earlier, the question of accommodating religious identity was until 
relatively recent times never seen as much of an issue. However, discussions 
about the place of religion in contemporary public policy in Britain have 
become strangely polarized. For some, against the back- drop of 9/11, 7/7 
and the so-called ‘War on Terror’, the rise of religious fundamentalisms, 
particularly those linked to political Islam, represents a ‘threat’ to the very 
idea of Western democratic ideals; characterized most potently in 
                                                        
1 In this regard the Mogul Emperor Akbar who ruled India during the later 16th 
Century or Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Founder of the Sikh Kingdom who ruled large 
parts of Northern India in the 19th Century come to mind 
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Huntington’s idea of ‘a clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1996). In this 
context ‘non-Western’ minorities in general, but particularly Muslims, are 
viewed with suspicion as a new ‘alien wedge’ or ‘enemy within’; This has 
triggered the British Government to introduce draconian policies for 
preventing, detecting and prosecuting violent extremism that has led to new 
forms of racial and religious profiling and surveillance.  
Bizarrely, cultural pluralism, once viewed as part of the solution, was now 
presented as a reason for social segregation leading to calls for policies aimed 
at assimilating minorities into the mainstream of ‘British’ culture and values. 
The most clear and absurd manifestation of this trend in the UK was the 
introduction of a ‘Life in the UK test’ based on multiple choice questions 
about UK history, culture and life, which all applicants for British nationality 
are required to pass (HMSO, 2007). It is significant to note the unanimity with 
which both Labour and Conservative political leaders have lined up to 
demonize multiculturalism as having caused a whole range of problems 
associated with social fragmentation on one hand and the rise of 
fundamentalist Islamic groups on the other. For example the previous prime 
minister Gordon Brown claimed that multiculturalism had become ‘an excuse 
for justifying separateness . . . [and] failing to emphasise what bound us 
together as a country’ (Brown, 2007). Similarly, in a widely reported debate 
ironically hosted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, David 
Cameron suggested that ‘State Multiculturalism’ was ‘leading to [Muslim - 
my emphasis] schoolgirls in Bradford disappearing from school and being 
forced into marriage’ (Sparrow, 2008). More recently we have seen the 
emergence of a debate around forced marriages and the protection of Young 
Asian women and also the issue of the practice of Female Genital Mutilation 
and the failure of social workers to intervene and treat is as a child protection 
issue due to cultural relativism or fears of being accused of racism. 
How has cultural pluralism gone from being the solution to the villain in such 
a short period of time within state policy? One clear reason is the emergence 
of home grown ‘Islamic terrorism’ and how the moral panics associated with 
assertions of a particularly assertive Islamic identity by young Muslims. 
Religion, once a privileged site for articulating multicultural difference, now 
appears to be the problem. It is this that explains successive UK Prime 
Ministers have been apologizing for being ‘too tolerant’ in the past and 
promising, however incoherently, to place the responsibility on non-white 
immigrants and their descendants to start ‘being British’ and to assimilate.  
Currently in the UK and France, the wearing or otherwise of Hijabs or face 
veils has symbolized this confusion around cultural pluralism and its limits. 
Whereas in France, primarily because of its republican and secular traditions, 
there is no tradition of policy makers working with religious groups, this is 
not the case in the UK. Mainly due to subcontinent politics, from the 1980’s 
we say the demise of Secular Black and Asian anti-racist groupings and the 
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simultaneous rise of faith based groupings. This has resulted in faith based 
groups and religious leaders being regularly feted by policy makers and a 
new partnership with government.  
For example, in a keynote conference address on 15 September 2010, the 
Chairman of the Conservative Party Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, seeking to out 
do the previous Labour government went as far as to imply the Conservative 
Party was the true ‘party of God’. 
. . . if anyone suggests that this government does not understand, 
does not appreciate, does not defend people of faith, dare I even say, 
does not ‘do God’, then I hope my schedule this week will go some 
way to banishing that myth. (BBC News, 2010) 
These statements highlight the way a general consensus within contemporary 
public policy has emerged in which an uncritical engagement with ‘faith 
communities’ has ceased to be seen as problematic, and where being sensitive 
to faith based ‘difference’ is seen as an end in itself. Whereas identity politics 
in general and ethnically sensitive policies and practices in particular were 
once championed by progressives as a means towards social justice (Iglehart 
and Becerra, 2008), many are now seriously concerned about the way secular 
anti-racism policies have now been almost entirely displaced by faith based 
approaches.  
Whilst there now is an emerging critique within the literature of the 
limitations of diversity and faith based approaches to policy (Cheong et al., 
2007; Kundnani, 2007), discussions about the relationship between these 
policies and contemporary religious fundamentalisms are much less 
developed. Within this moment, faith based multiculturalism takes on a 
profoundly oxymoronic role, where it is both some- thing to be feared, and 
simultaneously something to be celebrated; as though policy appears to veer 
between seeing the multicultural polity as the problem at one moment, and 
the solution in the next. 
Whilst it absolutely essential to distinguish between faith based groups in 
general and religious fundamentalism proper, our argument is that the 
encouragement of a faith agenda has created a Trojan Horse in which 
religious fundamentalist groups have become increasingly influential in a 
range of public policy arenas. Particularly revealing in this respect is the 
recent fallout at Amnesty International where the Head of the Gender Unit, 
Gita Sahgal, accused the charity of putting the human rights of terror suspects 
above those of their victims. Specifically she accused the organization of 
uncritically associating itself with ‘Caged Prisoners’, an organization, which 
she alleged, has an explicit political agenda to support ‘global jihad’ (Kerbaj, 
2010). The point here is the way these events reveal an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and division amongst groups, which were previously broadly 
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united around a progressive, anti-racist, feminist and human rights 
consensus.  
On the one hand religious discourse, once felt to be in decline and in a process 
of ‘withering away’ under the weight of a combination of secularism and 
general disinterest, is being asserted anew, with the policy framework around 
‘multiculturalism’ becoming a space in which arguments about the value of 
faith have become privileged. At the same time the rise of religious 
fundamentalisms, particularly those linked to political Islam in the UK, but 
which also echo in all of the major world religions internationally, is 
presented as a ‘threat’ to the very essence of democratic society. Religious 
minorities in general and Muslims in particular have come to be viewed with 
suspicion and hostility, as has been demonstrated by a recent report from 
Human Rights First, an internationally respected body, which documents 
widespread and sustained attacks on Muslims throughout Europe, with a 
particular upsurge following terrorist incidents and media driven campaigns 
(Human Rights First, 2007). 
A sign of the confusing times we are living in is ironically the way one of the 
most dramatic critiques of multiculturalism has come from Trevor Phillips, 
former head of the Commission for Racial Equality: the body which was 
responsible for developing these policies for the previous two decades. In a 
speech entitled ‘Sleepwalking to Segregation’ delivered in Manchester Town 
Hall on 22 September 2005, Phillips argued that despite 30 years of 
multiculturalism British society was becoming a more divided by race and 
religion and more unequal by ethnicity. He goes onto warn that Britain ‘could 
end up in 2048, a hundred years on from the Windrush, living in a Britain of 
passively co-existing ethnic and religious communities, eyeing each other 
uneasily over the fences of our differences’. (Phillips, 2005) 
The concern expressed here is that multiculturalism has weakened social 
cohesion and therefore in some way contributed to the terrorist attacks on 
London on 7/7 which were committed by British Born Muslim youth.  
William Pfaff, writing in the Observer argued, ‘these British bombers are a 
consequence of a misguided and catastrophic pursuit of multiculturalism’ 
(Pfaff, 2005). Similarly, Martin Wolf a respected left leaning journalist argued 
that multiculturalism was directly responsible for undermining the idea of 
‘citizenship’ and therefore it, ‘must be discarded as nonsense’ (‘When 
multiculturalism is a nonsense’, Financial Times, 31 August 2005, quoted in 
Modood, 2005a). 
Paralleling this sense of multiculturalism inadvertently perhaps of fostering 
religious and ethnic segregation, is an altogether different strand of thought 
that we need more not less multiculturalism. For example, the British 
sociologist, Tariq Modood argues that the problem is not that there has been 
excessive attention given to religious and faith based identities, but too little 
(Modood, 2005b). He argues that, certainly within the UK context organized 
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religious minority groups embody the next logical development of 
community based anti-racist activism and struggles against oppression. 
Within such an argument the basis for the political challenge to racism, 
exclusion and disadvantage lies in the assertion of religious as opposed to 
secular identities. In a discussion of the importance of faith based identity 
politics he argues that: 
The emergence of a ‘politics of difference’ out of and alongside a liberal 
assimilationist equality created a dissonance. Similarly, the emergence of a 
British Muslim identity out of and alongside ethno-racial identities has 
created an even greater dissonance because it challenges the hegemonic 
power of secularism in British political culture, especially on the centre-left. 
(Modood, 2005c: 12) 
In his most recent book Multiculturalism Modood makes the direct analogy 
between the struggles of the New Social Movements and arguments over the 
acceptance of religious identities. While the former have now been accepted 
within a liberal citizenship paradigm, Modood argues that: 
Muslims [. . . ] are now utilizing the same kind of argument and 
making a claim that religious identity, just like gay identity, and just 
like certain forms of racial identity, should not just be privatized and 
tolerated, but should be part of the public space. (2007: 70) 
Whilst Modood’s argument about the way in which faith has emerged as a 
potent organizing mechanism, for disenfranchised communities in particular, 
is important, it is the apparent ease with which the concept of a secular public 
space simply disappears which concerns us. The danger is that state policy 
being simply driven by a need to accommodate uncritically to these new faith 
based movements could lead to an undermining of the gains won by secular 
social movements, particularly in regard to women’s rights, and Gay and 
Lesbian issues. What is therefore crucially absent in Modood’s work is any 
sense of the different ideological thrust of these new faith based social 
movements, as opposed to the predominantly secular emphasis of the earlier 
New Social Movements (Crossley, 2002; Porta and Diani, 2005). 
New Fundamentalist Social Movements 
Whilst it would be wrong to conflate religious belief and identification with 
fundamentalism, in the context of geopolitical events impacting all faith 
groups, there can be no doubt that across the world we are seeing an 
emergence within a range of different religious traditions – Islam, 
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism – of a new form of militant piety and a 
general intolerance of liberal traditions associated with freedom of thought 
and expression. Chetan Bhatt, who has for instance followed the emergence of 
the BJP in India talks about the emergence of new forms of ‘religious 
absolutism’ which represent a militant intolerance of secularism (Bhatt, 2006). 
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An important defining feature of these new social movements is a sense of 
absolute truth of particular (though of course highly selective) religious 
discourses along with an assertion of primordial identities as the basis for 
new forms of nationalism. 
The starting point of religious fundamentalist claims is the idea of ‘cultural 
relativism’. Cultural relativism was born out of the work of radical 
anthropologists such as Frantz Boas and Margaret Mead in the first half of the 
20th century who sought to challenge colonial and racist representations of 
non-Europeans as primitive and inferior. It was on this basis that they sought 
to posit the idea of all cultures being of equal value. However, during the 
latter half of the 20th century, as the work of Gilles Kepel (2004) has 
illustrated, against the backdrop of a postmodern crisis of Enlightenment 
values associated with scientific progress, cultural relativism has been used to 
discredit secularist rationalism whilst at the same time legitimating religious 
claims.  
It is also important to understand the way this debate is taking place in a 
global context; Kepel’s work makes it clear that what we are seeing here is an 
issue that is not simply about one particular religion, but about the resurgent 
global influence of fundamentalist movements generally within Christianity, 
Judaism, Hinduism and Islam. Kepel traces the origins of this new form of 
more militant religion to the 1960s, where the link between religion and civil 
society was questioned, as much by those inside as those outside various 
religious institutions. He sees a significant change as having taken place 
around 1975 when this questioning process: 
. . . went into reverse. A new religious approach took shape, aimed 
no longer at adapting to secular values but by recovering a sacred 
foundation for the organization of society, by changing society if 
necessary. Expressed in a multitude of ways, this approach advocated 
moving on from a modern- ism that had failed, attributing its 
setbacks and dead ends to separation from God. The theme was no 
longer aggorniomento [accommodation] but a second evangelization 
of Europe; the aim was no longer to modernize Islam but to ‘Islamize 
modernity’. (Kepel, 2004: 2) 
The fundamentalist challenge to secularism was additionally emboldened 
through its concurrence with the postmodernist and postcolonial repudiation 
of Enlightenment traditions, of which secularism and universalism are 
amongst the most important (Malik, 1996). The postmodernist rejection of 
Enlightenment universalism (Lyotard, 1984) opened a space where 
essentialized ‘other-identity’ claims were legitimized and in some instances 
even celebrated as inherently progressive. Edward Said’s classic early work 
Orientalism (2003) provides an illustration of the dangers of a postcolonial 
critique, which presented the Enlightenment simply as an Imperial project. 
His all too frequently quoted assertion that ‘it is therefore correct that every 
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European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, 
an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric’ (Said, 2003: 204) created the 
very essentialism that he was seeking to undermine. It was by taking such 
observations out of their overall context, that fundamentalist ideologues were 
to give their claims a veneer of respectability; be they Islamic religious 
fundamentalists seeking to legitimize a notion of inherent anti-Western 
victimhood, or their mirror image in the form of conservative ideologues 
promoting their own agenda through the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, as 
discussed above. 
Therefore it could be argued that postmodernist arguments about 
‘subjectivity’ and ‘being’, far from advancing anti-racist thinking, led to the 
obfuscation of both the concrete historical struggles by colonized peoples as 
well as an understanding of the essentially political nature of contemporary 
fundamentalisms. Bhatt has noted the way in which this cultural relativism 
has allowed ‘… the concealment of political interests, groups and parties 
through discourses of authenticity, discrimination and victimhood which 
normalise what are otherwise quite mendacious political ambitions. (2006: 
102) 
Terry Eagleton has also discussed the way postmodernist arguments have 
been used by the Ulster Unionists in Northern Ireland to justify their claims 
for a specific cultural identity – the point is that this language gives a 
progressive gloss to something which is deeply reactionary and chauvinistic 
(Eagleton, 2006). One can see a similar strategy mobilized by the Hindu 
fundamentalist Hindutva movement in India, which relies heavily on 
postcolonial critiques of British cultural imperialism (Bhatt, 2001). In a 
broader sense the trap that progressives fell into in the face of the vacuum 
caused by the collapse of ‘actually existing socialism’ was, as Zizek has noted 
an obsession with the ‘constant creation of new terms; “postmodern society”, 
“risk society”, “post-industrial society” etc.’ (2009: 6) without attending to 
what was really new – the dramatic ascendancy of disparate but nonetheless 
powerful forms of religious fundamentalism. 
It is very important to understand that while fundamentalist movements 
often originate within the mainstream religious traditions, their political 
demands are far removed from the majority of religious organizations and 
individuals that make benign and largely sincere demands for religiosity, 
spirituality and affirmation of difference. As Kepel (2004) has noted, the key 
feature of fundamentalist movements is the construction of a sense of ‘crisis’ 
in society – in this sense we would argue that they are anti-systemic 
movements as opposed to the largely consensual attitude espoused by 
mainstream religious institu- tions. In effect this mobilization of a sense of 
crisis places them in direct competition with materially based political 
movements, such as the Zapatistas in Mexico or Naxalite groups in India. The 
dialectics of religious fundamentalist movements is that they seek to both 
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interpolate an existing (economic, political, social) crisis, as well as 
manufacture a sense of crisis based on the previously discussed notion of 
victimology, rooted in the godless nature of modernity. It is through this 
appeal to an ongoing grievance against a monolithic conception of ‘the West’ 
as innately evil2 that some fundamentalists have sought to impose, as Imam, 
Morgan and Yuval Davis have argued: 
. . . a single version of collective identity as the only true, authentic 
and valid one, and use it to impose their power and authority over 
‘their’ constituency . . . They usually claim to be the representatives 
of an authentic tradition, and they speak against the corrupting 
influence of modernity and ‘the West.’ (2004: x) 
This quote points to one of the crucial ways in which fundamentalist 
movements assert their power; that is to discipline, repudiate or expel those 
more tolerant, pluralist and hybrid elements within their own religious 
tradition, thereby seeking to ‘purify’ it. 
This notion of purification also points to a key paradox of fundamentalist 
movements; while on one hand they construct themselves through the 
language of a ‘return to the past’, they are in fact entirely products of the 
contemporary period. Rather than being ‘medieval’ as liberal secularist 
opponents often characterize them, fundamentalist movements are 
profoundly modern (Bhatt, 1997). While they argue that the setting free of 
reason from faith is the major cause of the social ills of modern society, and 
associate new technologies, and in particular multimedia, as being 
instrumental in the moral degradation of society, they themselves are highly 
adept at exploiting those very technologies they seek to demonize. In this 
sense, these movements are highly paradoxical; while they present 
themselves as expressions of and defenders of a primordial, traditional and 
pre-modern absolute truth, they are in fact highly proficient participants in 
the technology of modernity, be it in the exploitation of the internet, 
television, fund raising or the use of destructive weaponry. In this respect 
they could be characterized as ‘anti-modernist forms of modernity’. 
Hence the ascendancy of religious fundamentalism needs to be understood 
against the backdrop of two key historical processes. Firstly the power 
vacuum created through the decline and collapse of secular visions of a better 
world – be those socialist, communist, progressive nationalist, or feminist. 
Secondly the profoundly destabilizing impact of economic globalization, neo-
liberal economic policies and Structural Adjustment Programmes of the sort 
                                                        
2 For example the mobilization of the notion of ‘Great Satan’ as derogatory 
epithet for the United States of America and the West more generally by Iranian 




promoted by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Westra, 
2009). In the developing world, Westra argues, where these policies have been 
imposed without regard to their consequences, there have been devastating 
increases in poverty, homelessness and unemployment. Fundamentalist 
movements have been the beneficiaries of the anger, disillusionment and 
‘anomie’ caused by this. Emerson and Hartman have noted the way that ‘for 
Fundamentalists and their sympathizers, Western versions of modernization 
rush over them in a tidal wave of change, ripping up communities, values, 
social ties and meaning’ (2006: 131). It follows that the attraction of 
fundamentalism lies in part in the way it represents a protest to the 
imposition of Western neo-liberalism. Similarly Gilbert Achcar has argued 
that neo-liberal deregulation represents in effect ‘anomisation’ in the 
developing world, and it is this overwhelming level of change which causes a 
‘retrenchment to basic identity markers’, of which religion is one of the most 
significant (Achcar, 2009). It is the very destructiveness of contemporary 
capitalism that nurtures the return of religion as an attempt to rediscover 
meaning, as Zizek has noted: 
The problem is one of meaning, and it is here that religion is now 
reinventing its role, rediscovering its mission of guaranteeing a 
meaningful life to those who participate in the meaningless 
functioning of the capitalist machine. (2009: 25) 
And so, as Mooers (2005) suggests, any attempt to make sense of the 
production of cultural identities that does not factor in the impact of political 
economy is likely to result in a an obscuring of oppression. Multuculturalism, 
he suggests, has worked to fetishise ‘forms of liberal citizenship through its 
own peculiar dialectic of revelation and concealment by effacing the lived 
experience of racism and sexism through the apparent validation of visible 
forms of difference’ (p.15). In short, an emphasis on culture in the absence of 
examining the economic and political contexts in which it is produced and 
reproduced will simply result in the obscuring of relations of dominance and 
oppression. 
Concluding thoughts 
A key objective of this paper has been to understand the curiously 
paradoxical place of religion and faith based groupings in the contemporary 
multicultural polity, and the confusion, and in some instances conflicts, this 
has caused amongst progressives. The capacity of religious fundamentalists to 
acquire influence must be understood in three key ways. At the global level, 
fundamentalists, but particularly jihadist groups, have interpolated the sense 
of anomie that has come as a consequence of the overwhelming social change 
rep- resented in particular by neo-liberal economic policies. At the national 
level, the Janus face of government policy leads on one hand to policies and 
strategies, developed under the rubric of the ‘War Against Terror’, which 
have victimized entire Muslim communities whilst at the same time by 
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extending the remit of multiculturalism to incorporate religion, has allowed 
religious social movements, including fundamentalist groups to occupy the 
space of defenders of the oppressed. 
Perhaps the most important starting point in thinking about the efficacy or 
otherwise of cultural pluralism is to note that the making of culture is both a 
unfinished and contested project. Despite the claims of fundamentalists and 
nationalists, religious or ethnic groups are never monolithic, but are 
manifestations of hegemonic struggles.  Cultural relativism, as noted by Anne 
Philips (2001) is not a useful ally when it comes to women’s struggle over 
oppression’ (piii) and a ‘hands-ff approach to cultural difference can end up 
capitulating to unjust social power’ (piii) All cultural groups, particularly 
those defined in religious terms are always internally differentiated along 
lines of gender, class and caste, social justice is perhaps best served by 
building some common aspirations. To avoid cultural imperialism this needs 
to be done in a ways that gives voice and testimony to the oppressed within 
each group.  It also means recognizing that despite the efforts philosophers 
and political scientists, the project of conceptualizing justice and equality is 
itself imminent. Hence, it is important that there is maximum cross-cultural 
engagement in the formation and reformation of universal principles and 
policies that one might seek to deploy. Moreover, such discussions will need 
to factor in a political economy element that seeks always to establish the link 
between material factors and the production and reproduction of cultures of 
exclusion and oppression. Perhaps only then can one create the possibility of 
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